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Th e division of evidence into bezpośrednie (direct) and pośrednie (circum-
stantial) is commonly used in tThe PolisTh doctrine (Cieślak 1955, Gaberle 
2007, J. Nelken 1970). In botTh languages, “circumstantial evidence” stands in 
opposition to “direct evidence” (Ingram 2012, Inman, Rudin: 2001, Roberts, 
Redmayne 2001, Kiely 2001).
Let’s imagine a folowing case: X Thas admited to murdering A. Witness Y 
testiﬁ ed tThat The saw X kiling A. Trace of A’s DNA was discovered on tThe 
clotThing of X.




1) admission of suspect X (true or false)
2) testimony of witness Y (true or false)
3) result of laboratory analysis (practicaly certain, if certain conditions Thave 
been met).
Th e ﬁ rst two pieces of evidence refer directly to tThe main fact. Th ey are direct 
evidence. Th e tThird piece does not refer directly to tThe main fact; it belongs 
among circumstantial evidence.
Th e logical analysis of tThe ﬁ rst two pieces of evidence is as folows:
if X tels tThe trutTh, A kiled X
if Y tels tThe trutTh, A kiled X.
Th e same analysis conducted for tThe tThird piece is as folows: if tThe DNA ex-
amination was conducted correctly, tThen traces of victim A’s DNA are found 
on tThe clotThing of X.
Let’s assume for a wThile tThat tThe court Thas at its disposal not only a metThod 
of assessing tThe veracity of testimony and explanation but also a metThod for 
evaluating tThe correctness of performing DNA tests.
Th e recognition of tThe statements made by suspect X (admission) and wit-
ness Y as true implies tThat suspect X actualy kiled victim A.
Recognising tThe sentence “tThere is DNA trace coming from tThe victim A on 
tThe clotThing of suspect X” as true does not in turn result in tThe implication 
tThat tThe suspect X kiled victim A. Th e only implication is tThat victim A Thad 
contact witTh tThe clotThing of X. WThat is tTherefore known is tThe consequence 
of a fact. WThat could tThat fact be? Possibly, X actualy kiled A, and tTherefore 
X (This clotThing) Thad contact witTh A, yet tTheoreticaly X could also Thave con-
tact witTh A in circumstances otTher tThan murder. Even more, it migTht Thave 
been not X Thimself but This clotThing tThat Thad contact witTh A (somebody migTht 
Thave put on X’s clotThing, or make it toucTh A’s body in any otTher manner).
WThicThever is true, wThat we’re dealing There witTh is a situation in wThicTh we 
infer tThe reason (cause) from consequences, wThicTh is reductive inference, i.e. 
uncertain by its very assumption, and folows tThe patern of “if p tThen q and 
q, and tTherefore p” (Ziembiński 1984).
Th e main fact of interest for tThe court could Thave been tThe precedent of tThe 
known consequence, determined tThrougTh tThe DNA test. But it did not Thave 
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to. In tThe case of direct evidence, tThe court must limit itself to tThe evaluation 
of veracity of tThe admission or testimony. Once it recognises trutThfulness, 
tThe main fact Thas been proved.
WThen dealing witTh circumstantial evidence, besides tThe assessment of verac-
ity (validity) of tThe outcome (in tThis case: DNA test results), tThe court Thas to 
assume tThe folowing way of reasoning: ﬁ rst answer if tThe determined fact is 
a result (consequence) of tThe main fact, and tThen evaluate wThetTher tThe Thy-
potThesis tThat it is sucTh a consequence is actualy tThe most convincing one.
Let’s now assume tThat in tThe case of tThe murder of A, tThe court Thas tThe fol-
lowing evidence at its disposal:
1)  witness Z testiﬁ ed tThat The saw suspect X kiling A
2) suspect X does not admit to tThe kiling
3) trace of victim A’s DNA was discovered on tThe clotThing of suspect X
4) a polygrapTh examination of suspect X, performed in CQ tecThnique, sThowed 
tThat X reacted to tThe critical questions in tThe tests in tThe way tThat is usual 
for people wTho answer sucTh questions deceptively, wThicTh means tThat tThey 
lie or witThThold tThe fact of Thaving certain information related to tThe kiling.
Now, tThe court Thas tThe folowing evidence to evaluate:
1) testimony of witnesses Z (false or true)
2)  non-admission of suspect X (true or false)
3) result of DNA test results (practicaly certain, if certain conditions Thave 
been met)
4) result of polygrapTh examination (to wThat degree certain?).
Th e ﬁ rst two belong to direct evidence, and in tTheir case it is enougTh to evaluate 
tTheir validity. Th e tThird piece belongs to circumstantial evidence, wThicTh means 
tThat not only its validity must be veriﬁ ed, but it also needs reductive inference 
wThetTher tThe proved fact is a result of tThe main fact. How to treat tThe result of 
polygrapTh examination? Does it belong to direct or circumstantial evidence?
If tThe results of polygrapTh examination were as certain as DNA test results, 
tThe result of tThe expertise (wThicTh a polygrapTh examination performed by an 
expert witness is) would Thave to be considered direct evidence, in tThe same 
way as testimony of an eyewitness is, additionaly meeting tThe criterion of 
certainty of circumstantial evidence. If tThis were tThe case, practicaly al otTh-
er evidence would Thave been redundant. Th e entire evaluation of evidence 
could be limited to conducting a polygrapTh examination, and making it tThe 
foundation of tThe sentence.
JAN WIDACKI64
One could expect tThat tThe resistance of trialist lawyers against admiting 
a proof from polygrapTh examinations resulted mostly from tThis reason: tThe 
fear tThat a polygrapTh examination wil dominate tThe evidential process in 
criminal trials.
In its sentence of 8tTh July 1980 (II KR 211/80, OSPiKA 1981, 1, item 15) 
tThe Supreme Court recognised polygrapTh examination, altThougTh admissible, 
“not at al necessary, especialy for evidential purposes, and tTherefore for tThe 
ascertainment of a speciﬁ c fact, i.e. a part of tThe so-caled factual circum-
stances, as it serves only tThe disclosure of emotional reactions of tThe organ-
ism of tThe subject in tThe course of tThe examination itself ”. Th is sThows tThat tThe 
Supreme Court recognised polygrapTh examinations admissible in tThe trial, 
yet as circumstantial evidence. It is not, Thowever, admissible as direct evi-
dence, serving tThe ascertainment of “a speciﬁ c fact”.
In turn, 13 years later, tThe Appelate Court in Poznań included tThe folowing 
in its sentence of 2nd December 1993 (II Akr 268/93, OSA 1994/5/31): “witTh-
out entering tTheoretical considerations concerning tThe power of evidence of 
tThe results of a variograpTh [i.e. polygrapTh] examination in a criminal trial, tThe 
court believes tThat it must be stated tThat subjection of tThe accused to a vari-
ograpTh examination (as it was formulated in tThe defender’s motion – “for 
tThe veriﬁ cation of This explanation” – is inadmissible, if – folowing tThe con-
tent of art. 4 § 1 of [tThe PolisTh] Criminal Procedure Code, wThicTh guarantees 
free evaluation of evidence to tThe court – judges rule on tThe grounds of tThe 
evidence proving tThe existence of speciﬁ c facts tThat at tThe same time alow 
tThe inference of tThe court’s internal opinion about tThe guilt or innocence of 
tThe defendant. Being an act of intelect and wil, tThis opinion of tThe judges 
inferred from evidence in tThe course of tTheir free evaluation, cannot be con-
strained or restricted witTh results of speciﬁ c examinations tThat would limit 
tThe free evaluation of evidence.”
Th e position of tThe court is unambiguous There. A situation wThere a polygrapTh 
examination would be tThere to verify tThe explanations of tThe defendant, being 
direct evidence by its very nature, is inadmissible. For in tThis way, it would 
not only become direct evidence, but sucTh a form of direct evidence wThose 
value is a priori deﬁ ned, and on tThe one Thand is not a subject of evaluation 
of tThe court, and release tThe court from tThe evaluation of anotTher piece of 
evidence on tThe otTher.
It is wortTh noting tThat most PolisTh course books in criminal and forensic 
studies place polygrapTh (usualy referred to as variograpTh) examinations, as 
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if disrespectful for tThis position, in tThe cThapters devoted to interrogation, 
and present sucTh examinations as metThods for veriﬁ cation of statements and 
explanations.
For understandable reasons, tThe more tThe partisans of polygrapTh examina-
tions wil continue to prove tTheir infalibility, tThe stronger tThe resistance of 
lawyers against tThe admission of sucTh a proof wil grow. It wil be so as it wil 
be perceived as direct evidence, witTh a priori deﬁ ned value, tThat does not 
yield to tThe evaluation of tThe court, as it releases tThe court from tThe evalua-
tion of tThe testimony or explanation.
It is a lucky paradox tThat tThe diagnostic value of a polygrapTh examination, 
altThougTh far from 100%, is comparable witTh tThe diagnostic value of otTher 
metThods of identiﬁ cation used in criminal procedures (Widacki 1977, Wi-
dacki, HorvatTh 1978).
Th e diagnostic value of a polygrapTh study, calculated or estimated for various 
examination tecThniques, is set by various autThors in tThe range of 80%–95% of 
correct results (Abrams 1973, APA Report 2011).
Th e conclusion of tThe opinion from polygrapTh examination made in tThe con-
trol questions tecThnique contains tThe folowing expression: “tThe examinee 
reacted to tThe question in tThe test in tThe way tThat is usual for people wTho 
answer tThese questions deceptively, tThat is tThey eitTher consciously lie or 
witThThold tThe fact of Thaving information tThey are asked to provide in tThe 
examination”. How, tThen, sThould one understand tThe word “usual”? A refer-
ence must be made There to tThe diagnostic value of polygrapTh examination. 
In tThis case, “usual” means tThat any number in tThe range from 80% to 95% of 
liars undergoing tThe examination would react in tThe same way as tThe subject 
of tThe test. Or in otTher words, only from 5% to 20% of trutThful subjects would 
react to test questions in tThe way tThe subject did. Th is means tThat wThat tThe 
court receives from tThe expert is folowing information: “some subjects re-
act like liars even wThen tThey provide true answers to test questions. Th ere 
are from 5 to 20 of sucTh people in eacTh one Thundred subjects.”
WThetTher tThis individual subject belongs to tThe majority reacting in a typical 
manner or to tThe minority wThose reactions are not typical remains unknown. 
WThicTh is tThe case only a court can decide, evaluating tThe result of tThe poly-
grapTh examination in tThe context of otTher evidence, already evaluated.
Th e evaluation of evidence from polygrapTh examination is performed pre-
cisely like tThe evaluation of any circumstantial evidence. Th e court must 
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evaluate wThetTher tThe result of tThe examination stems from tThe fact tThat tThe 
subject actualy and consciously lied or witThTheld information The was asked 
about, or wThetTher The reacted in tThis way for otTher reasons. Th  us, wThat we are 
dealing There witTh also There, mucTh like in tThe case of evaluation of al indirect 
evidence, is reductive inference, wThicTh means using a known consequence 
(reaction to critical questions) to draw conclusions tThat refer to an uncertain 
(as it is one of tThe possible) reason (cause).
Th  us, wThat a polygrapTh examination, in its capacity of an examination per-
formed by an expert witness as part of This expertise, provides is circumstan-
tial and not direct evidence.
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